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INTRODUCTION 
The United Kingdom’s relationship with the European Union 
has always been somewhat half-hearted. This goes back to the very 
early days, when negotiations started first on what became the 
European Coal and Steel Community, and history repeated itself in 
the negotiations leading up to what became the European 
Communities. That the preference for intergovernmental, rather than 
supranational, cooperation was a second-rate choice only gradually 
                                                                                                             
* B.A. 1975, M.A. 1979, Oxford University; M.Sc. 1976, London University (LSE); 
Barrister, Middle Temple, 1978; LL.D. Utrecht University 1985; Professor of European Law 
& Jean Monnet Professor, University of Groningen (The Netherlands), Jean Monnet Centre of 
Excellence; Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium). This paper is a vastly 
extended and updated version of two presentations I gave at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the 
Association of American Law Schools in San Francisco. I am grateful to Professor Roger 
Goebel from Fordham Law School and Professor Leo Martinez of the University of California, 
Hastings College of the Law for their kind invitations to speak, and to the European Law 
Faculties Association, of which I was President in 2015—2016, for facilitating my attendance. 
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dawned on the British establishment, and by the time the potential 
suitor was ready to tie the knot, the bride was playing hard to get – or 
at least General de Gaulle, like a parent who disapproves of a 
potential marriage, made it clear that the time was not yet ripe.1 A 
second attempt in 1967 under the Labour Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson also left bride and suitor far from the altar. Only after de 
Gaulle’s departure from power did France change its mind. The 
Conservative government in the United Kingdom under Prime 
Minister Edward Heath (who had led the British negotiating team first 
time round) brought negotiations to a successful conclusion, resulting 
in the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities 
on January 1, 1973. Ireland and Denmark also acceded on that date. 
Accession was accomplished, from the UK’s viewpoint, 
perfectly orthodoxly in accordance with its dualist approach to 
international legal obligations. Domestic legal effect of European 
Community law was ensured through an Act of Parliament, the 
European Communities Act 1972. That Act functioned as the horse 
on which European law rode into the United Kingdom, and, once 
there, dismounted and went about its business without further 
recourse to the horse. That is not to say that the horse was of no 
further value. It had many qualities: it ensured that the direct 
applicability and the direct effect2 of various types of Community 
(now EU) law could be fitted into the United Kingdom’s various legal 
systems;3 it also instructed the UK judiciary to take judicial notice of 
judgments and expressions of opinion by the European Court of 
Justice (“ECJ”) and to have regard to the principles laid down by and 
any decision of the ECJ, and to treat questions of (now) EU law as 
questions of law, not as questions of fact4 (which is how questions of 
                                                                                                             
1 .   See, generally, MIRIAM CAMPS, BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
1955—1963 (1964); RICHARD MAYNE, THE RECOVERY OF EUROPE (1970). For a 
useful brief summary of the process leading to the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
European Communities, see PAUL J. G. KAPTEYN & PIETER VERLOREN VAN 
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 17-21 
(Laurence W. Gormley ed., 3rd ed.1998). 
2.   The concept of direct applicability means that no further action at European or 
national level is necessary for a particular provision of EU law to be operational; the concept 
of direct effect relates to whether a person can rely on a particular provision of EU law in 
judicial or administrative proceedings. While these concepts were confusingly initially used 
interchangeably, this is no longer generally done, even in Leiden. See Kapteyn & Van 
Themaat, supra note 1, at 526. 
3.   For key provisions, see European Communities Act 1972, c. 68, § 2(1), (2), (4). 
4.   See id. § 3(1), (2). 
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foreign law are treated in the UK). But those initial instructions 
having been given, the rights and obligations under European law 
were applied in accordance with European law itself. 
The marriage between the UK and the Communities got into a 
rocky period politically, with the election of a Labour government in 
February 1974 and its re-election in October of that year. A 
renegotiation of certain (mainly financial) aspects followed, and a 
referendum was held in June 1975, in which just over two thirds of 
those who voted were in favor of remaining in the Communities.5 
Financial considerations were also the background to Margaret 
Thatcher’s negotiation of a budgetary rebate for the UK in 1980, on 
the well-known legal basis of wanting a large part of her money 
back.6 
While the love of money is the root of all evil,7 there was more 
to the disquiet than merely money. On the right wing of the 
Conservative party, shrill voices protested about of loss of 
sovereignty and being run by Brussels; the UK Parliament only rather 
grudgingly accepted the idea of direct elections to the European 
Parliament.8 The Labour Party for many years in the 1980s was also 
not exactly pro-European; only in the 1990s did it change its stance, 
and embrace support for European integration. Margaret Thatcher’s 
Bruges Speech, delivered on December 20, 1988 at the College of 
                                                                                                             
5.   See Ronald Irving, The United Kingdom Referendum, June 1975, 1 EUR. L. REV. 3 
(1976). See also Vaughne Miller, The 1974—75 U.K. Renegotiation of EEC Membership and 
Referendum, HOUSE OF COMMONS BRIEFING PAPER No. 7253, 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.U.K./ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7253. 
6.   See Michael Jenkin, Britain and the Community Budget: The end of a chapter, 17 
C.M.L. REV. 493 (1980). 
7.   1 Timothy 6:10 (King James). 
8.   See European Assembly Elections Act 1978, § 6, which provided that no new treaty 
providing for an increase in the power of the Assembly should be ratified unless approved by 
an Act of Parliament. This provision was then re-enacted as section 12 of the European 
Parliamentary Elections Act 2002. The Assembly was the old name for the European 
Parliament, which decided to start using the latter name on 30 March 1962. See the 
Resolutions of 20 March 1958, 1958 J.O. 6/58; Resolutions of 30 March 1962, 1962 J.O. 
1045/62. Article 3(1) of the Single European Act brought the name ‘European Parliament’ into 
the Treaties officially, although that name had long been used in official documents. See, e.g., 
Decision of the Governments of the Member States concerning the Provisional Location of 
Certain Institutions and Departments of the Communities, 1967 J.O. P 152/18; see, e.g., 
Council Decision 76/787, 1976 O.J. 278/1, corr. 1976 O.J. L 326/32, and its annexed Act 
concerning the election of representatives to the European Parliament. As to the European 
Parliament, see RICHARD CORBETT, FRANCIS JACOBS & DARREN NEVILLE, THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (9th. ed., 2016). 
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Europe in Bruges,9 inspired the formalization of thought on the right 
of the political spectrum, first in the Bruges Group and later in the 
development of the United Kingdom Independence Party (“UKIP”). 
This latter group was originally established by historian Alan Sked, 
and was initially little more than a fringe, one-issue group; it became 
a populist party in later years, achieving “major party” status in 2014. 
Increasingly Europhobe sentiments in Conservative selection 
committees led to significant intakes of Eurosceptic Members of 
Parliament into the House of Commons—not a majority of 
Conservatives, by any means, but enough to cause difficulties. This 
meant that in times of small majorities, they had to be taken into 
account by the sitting government. Step by step the distrust of the 
European Union became more evident, and the European Union 
(Amendment) Act 2008 required the approval by Act of Parliament 
before ratification by the United Kingdom of any alteration of the 
competences of the European Union, or its decision-making processes 
or institutions, in such a way as to dilute the influence of individual 
Member States. 10  This pattern was taken a step further in the 
European Union Act 2011. 11  In July 2012 the UK government 
launched a review of the balance of competences, an audit of what the 
European Union was doing and how it affected the United Kingdom. 
Like many government initiatives, it was launched with much 
trumpeting, but when the results of the wide-ranging consultation 
came in, the overall conclusion was that the balance was actually just 
                                                                                                             
9.   See Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, Speech to the College of Europe: The 
“Bruges Speech” (Sep. 20, 1988) (transcript available at http://www.margaretthatcher.org/
document/107332). 
10.  See European Union (Amendment) Act 2008, c. 7, §§ 5, 6 (requiring ministers not 
to vote in favor of any decision under certain articles of the Treaty on European Union 
(“TEU”) and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) without prior 
parliamentary approval). As to the latest consolidated version of the Treaty on European 
Union, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, 2016 O.J. C 202/1 
[hereinafter TEU post-Lisbon]. As to the latest consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, see Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union, 2016 O.J. C 202/13 [hereinafter TFEU]. 
11.  The European Union Act 2011 imposed various restrictions on the ratification by 
ministers of amendments to or replacement of the TEU and the TFEU, and on the approval of 
certain decisions under the simplified revision procedure, as well as various restrictions of 
agreement to other types of measures without prior parliamentary approval. See European 
Union Act 2011, c. 12, §§ 2-12. Moreover, section 18 of that Act provided that directly 
applicable or directly effective EU law fell to be recognized and available in law in the United 
Kingdom only by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 or where it was required to be 
recognized and available in law by virtue of any other Act of Parliament. See European Union 
Act 2011, c. 12, § 18. 
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about right; such an unwelcome conclusion led to all mention of the 
results being quietly dropped.12 
On January 23, 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced in his “Bloomberg Speech”13 that he would be seeking a 
new treaty, or at least a renegotiation, to meet British concerns. It 
took a long time for the British government to specify in detail 
changes it wanted to see; indeed, it was not until a letter of November 
10, 2015 that the issues of concern were formally raised.14 In the 
Conservative party’s 2015 general election manifesto, Cameron 
committed his government to holding a referendum, should the 
Conservatives be elected.15 In this case that manifesto commitment 
was honored in what became the European Union Referendum Act 
2015. That Act did not provide for any threshold either concerning 
turnout or the majority. The referendum was held after negotiations 
had taken place on the issues raised in Cameron’s letter of the 
previous November. Those negotiations resulted in “A New 
Settlement for the United Kingdom within the European Union.”16 As 
seems to be customary when the people are consulted on issues that 
have been the subject of international negotiations, scant regard was 
paid to this new settlement in the referendum campaign: the 
referendum was about “in or out” rather than what had been agreed, 
although a vote to remain would have triggered a notification to the 
Secretary General of the Council of the European Union that the 
United Kingdom would remain a member of the European Union. 
The original referendum question proposed was, “Should the United 
Kingdom remain a member of the European Union?” The options 
would have been to vote “Yes” or “No.” However, the UK Electoral 
                                                                                                             
12.  FOREIGN & COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES 
AND EUROPEAN UNION LAWS AND REGULATION, https://www.gov.uk/guidance/review-of-
the-balance-of-competences (guidance on contributions); Tony Brown, The Curious Incident 
of the UK Competences Review, THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN AFFAIRS 
BLOG (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.iiea.com/blogosphere/the-curious-incident-of-the-uk-
competences-review (discussion of how the results were effectively sidelined). 
13. See David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, EU Speech at Bloomberg 
(Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.gov.U.K./government/speeches/eu-speech-at-bloomberg. 
14. Letter from David Cameron, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, to Donald Tusk, 
President, European Council (Nov. 10, 2015) (writing about a new settlement for the United 
Kingdom in a Reformed European Union), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/475679/Donald_Tusk_letter.pdf. 
15.  See The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015, 72-73, https://www.conservatives.com/
manifesto pp 72-73. 
16.  Eur. Council Notice (New Settlement), 2016 O.J. C 69I/1. 
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Commission, when consulted by political parties, decided that this 
should be redrafted to read, “Should the United Kingdom remain a 
member of the European Union or leave the European Union?” The 
options became to vote “Remain a member of the European Union” 
or “Leave the European Union.” Paul Craig has rightly and eloquently 
described Brexit, as it is now known, as “a drama in six acts,” and 
peppered his views with apposite quotations from Shakespeare.17 
On June 23, 2016, the referendum took place. After a campaign 
in which regard for factual accuracy was sacrificed on the altar of 
almost visceral hatred of the European Union in Eurosceptic circles, 
72.2 percent of those entitled to vote exercised their right to do so. 
51.9 percent of those who voted opted to support the leave campaign, 
and 48.1 percent opted to support the remain campaign. While a 
majority supported the leave campaign numerically, it is clear that 
less than half of the entire population that was entitled to vote did so. 
It is no exaggeration to say that the campaign was characterized by 
blatant lies, whipping up fears, and populist rhetoric.18 Given that the 
popular press, and some sections of the allegedly “quality” press, had 
for years been none too careful about objective reporting about the 
European Union, the charms of little England and the superficial 
populist attractions of UKIP resonated rather like the sirens of the 
Lorelei, luring voters onto the rocks. Cameron duly resigned, having 
effectively sacrificed the UK’s membership of the European Union to 
feed the baying hounds of the right wing in his own party and the 
yelping of UKIP. After a drama within the Conservative party 
resembling a Shakespearean tragedy, Theresa May succeeded him as 
Prime Minister, determined to follow the referendum result. While the 
referendum result was not legally binding, in political terms it was 
fiendishly difficult to ignore. 
                                                                                                             
17.   Paul Craig, Brexit: A Drama in Six Acts 40 EUR. L. REV. 447 (2016). 
18.   David Davis, a prominent ‘leave’ campaigner who is presently the Secretary of 
State for exiting the European Union, has been reported as finding the untruths in the 
campaign unimportant. Jon Stone, Brexit Secretary David Davis says EU referendum 
campaign untruths ‘not important’, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 4, 2016, 2:45 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/david-davis-brexit-secretary-eu-referendum-
campaign-lies-a7344611.html (last visited May 9, 2017). Richard Corbett MEP hosts a useful 
list of ‘Brexit Lies’: see Richard Corbett, Brexit Lies, http://www.richardcorbett.org.U.K./long-
list-leave-lies/ (last visited May 9, 2017); see also Brexit Lies, http://brexitlies.com (last 
visited May 9, 2017). 
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I. THE LEAVING MECHANISM 
Leaving the European Union has always been possible, but it is 
only since the changes to the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”), 
made by the Treaty of Lisbon, that a special procedure has been 
established. This is set out in Article 50 of the TEU and is itself 
perfectly orthodox, proclaiming in Article 50(1) that, “[a]ny Member 
State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its 
own constitutional requirements.” The mechanics of leaving are then 
set out in Article 50(2): the Member State concerned will notify the 
European Council of its intention to withdraw from the European 
Union. The European Council (without the member representing the 
withdrawing Member State) 19  then provides guidelines for the 
negotiation and conclusion of an agreement with the withdrawing 
Member State, “setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, 
taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the 
Union.” The negotiations are to be carried out in accordance with 
Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (“TFEU”). The European Commission, accordingly, will 
submit recommendations to the Council, which will confer upon the 
Commission a negotiating mandate and nominate the European 
Union’s negotiator or head of the European Union’s negotiating team. 
The Commission, when the referendum result became clear, 
designated Michel Barnier, a former member of the Commission, to 
act as Chief Negotiator of its Task Force for the Preparation and 
Conduct of the Negotiations. The Council has the power to choose, as 
it invariably does, to address directives to the negotiator (done in the 
negotiating mandate) and to establish a special committee in 
consultation with which the negotiations must be conducted. In due 
course the negotiator will make a proposal to the Council as to the 
signature and conclusion of the agreement.20 The Council will then 
conclude the agreement on behalf of the European Union, acting by 
qualified majority vote,21 after obtaining the consent of the European 
Parliament. 
                                                                                                             
19.    TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 10, art. 50(4) ¶ 1. 
20.    TFEU, supra note 10, art. 218 ¶¶ 3-6. 
21.    TEU post-Lisbon, supra note 10, art. 50(4) ¶ 2 provides that a qualified majority 
is to be determined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) TFEU, i.e. at least 72% of the 
members of the Council representing the (here) 27 participating Member States, comprising at 
least 65% of the population of those 27 States, must be in favor. 
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A number of points stand out here. First, the agreement is an 
agreement concluded by the Council with the United Kingdom; it is 
not a mixed agreement concluded by the Council and the twenty-
seven remaining States on the one hand, with the United Kingdom on 
the other. Secondly, the normal special committee procedure may 
prove somewhat cumbersome, given the political involvement of the 
European Council, although the Council would not even contemplate 
leaving the Commission to conduct the negotiations without some 
form of a special committee hovering behind the latter’s back in some 
form or other. Third, the fact that the Council will act by a qualified 
majority will limit the blackmail possibilities for individual Member 
States seeking to “punish” the United Kingdom. Fourth, it would 
appear that the withdrawal agreement will embrace the future 
relationship of the United Kingdom with the European Union, but it 
might be that a “hard Brexit” would result in a simple withdrawal 
treaty, or, as will be apparent from what follows below, even no 
treaty; the question of a future relationship would have to be 
subsequently worked out. Fifth, it would be possible for the European 
Parliament to refuse its consent. If this happened, then the two-year 
curtain (or the curtain at the end of an agreed extended period) would 
simply fall, as the proposed agreement would not have entered into 
force. This prospect makes it less likely that the European Parliament 
would withhold its consent, unless it felt that the European Union 
would be better off with no deal at all than with an agreement that the 
European Parliament regarded as unsatisfactory. Finally, while there 
is no mention of a Member State withdrawing its notification of 
intention to leave, it is inconceivable that this could not be done if the 
political landscape changed or if the conclusion was reached that it 
would be in the United Kingdom’s best interests not to press ahead 
with withdrawal. While the likelihood of either of these occurring in 
the present political climate in the United Kingdom may be slight to 
downright zero, it is certainly not obvious that the notification under 
Article 50(2) of the TEU is a one-way street.22 
                                                                                                             
22.   Both the Divisional Court and the U.K. Supreme Court treated Article 50(2) as 
being irreversible, given that the parties to the litigation in The Queen on the application of 
Miller et al v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin) 
& The Queen on the application of Miller et al v Secretary of State for Exiting the European 
Union [2017] U.K.SC 5 were of the view that this was the case, so the courts did not bother to 
rule on the issue. The question whether Article 50(2) is reversible is a question of EU law 
itself, so if the U.K. courts had not taken the view they did, they would have had little option 
but to refer the question for a preliminary ruling from the ECJ under Article 267 TFEU. That 
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By virtue of Article 50(3) of the TEU, the TEU and TFEU will 
cease to apply to the United Kingdom from the date of entry into 
force of the withdrawal agreement; if no agreement has been reached 
within two years of the notification of the United Kingdom’s intention 
to withdraw, the TEU and TFEU will cease to apply to the United 
Kingdom as from the expiry of that two-year period, unless the 
European Council, acting unanimously, and in agreement with the 
United Kingdom, decides to extend that period. 
In a communiqué after the informal meeting of the Heads of 
State or Government of twenty-seven Member States, as well as the 
Presidents of the European Council and the Commission in Brussels 
on December 15, 2016,23 the procedures that will be followed were 
set out. After the notification by the United Kingdom under Article 50 
of the TFEU, the European Council will adopt guidelines defining the 
framework for negotiations, and setting out the overall positions and 
principles that the European Union will pursue during those 
negotiations; these guidelines will be updated during the negotiations 
as necessary. The European Council will then invite the Council 
(meeting in the composition for general affairs) to adopt quickly a 
decision authorizing the opening of negotiations following a 
recommendation by the Commission and dealing with subsequent 
steps in the process. The negotiating directives will also be adopted 
by the Council; these will deal with substance and with the 
relationship between the Council and its preparatory bodies on the 
one hand and the union negotiator on the other. The negotiating 
directives may be amended and supplemented as appropriate during 
the negotiations to reflect the guidelines from the European Council 
as they evolve. Appropriately, the Council will be invited to nominate 
the Commission as EU negotiator, which effectively confirms that 
Barnier will, as expected, lead the negotiations. The significant 
development lies in how the links between the negotiator and the 
Council, and the European Council will be ensured; here, 
transparency and trust-building have been central considerations. 
Barnier’s team will integrate a representative of the rotating 
                                                                                                             
would have involved considerable delay, even if the ECJ would have been willing to expedite 
the case; given the political climate in the U.K. such delay would have been distinctly 
unfortunate to put it mildly. Sometimes neglecting the elephant in the room may be the better 
option. 
23.   Press Release from the President of the European Council, 782/16 (available at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/12/47244652443_en.pdf). The 
following discussion briefly sets out the proposed approach. 
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Presidency of the Council; representatives of the President of the 
European Council will be present and participate, in a supporting role, 
in all the negotiation sessions alongside the representatives of the 
Commission. As might be expected, the EU negotiator is to report 
systematically to the European Council, the Council, and its 
preparatory bodies. Between meetings of the European Council, the 
Council, and Coreper,24 assisted by a dedicated working party with a 
permanent chair, are to ensure that the negotiations are conducted in 
line with the European Council guidelines and the Council 
negotiating directives, and provide guidance to the EU negotiator. In 
accordance with Article 50(4) of the TEU, the representatives of the 
United Kingdom in the European Council, the Council, and its 
preparatory bodies will not participate in the discussions or decisions 
concerning it. The representatives of the twenty-seven Heads of State 
and Government will be involved in the preparation of the European 
Council as necessary, and representatives of the European Parliament 
will be invited to attend preparatory meetings. The EU negotiator will 
be requested to keep the European Parliament closely and regularly 
informed throughout the negotiations, and the Presidency of the 
Council will be willing to inform and exchange views with the 
European Parliament before and after each meeting of the Council 
(again in the composition for general affairs). Finally, the President of 
the European Council will be invited to be heard at the beginning of 
the meetings of the European Council. This last point is nothing new, 
as it is standard practice anyway. 
From the United Kingdom’s point of view, withdrawal, like 
accession, would be internationally effected by exercise of the Royal 
Prerogative, by the government acting in the name of the Crown; 
ratification of the withdrawal agreement reached would be subject to 
the negative resolution procedure envisaged in section 20 of the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. If Parliament 
attempted to restrain ratification, the prospect of the curtain of Article 
50(3) of TFEU falling would still loom. If no agreement had been 
reached and the curtain of Article 50(3) of the TEU fell, Parliament’s 
role, as there would be no treaty to be ratified, would simply be 
confined to the domestic sphere. Domestically, the European 
                                                                                                             
24.  Coreper is the acronym (from the French name comité des représantants 
permanents) for the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the governments of the 
Member States (i.e. their ambassadors to the EU). See TFEU supra note 10, art. 240(1), (2016) 
O.J. C 202/154. 
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Communities Act 1972 and related legislation would need to be 
repealed, and that repeal would need to be coordinated with the actual 
date of withdrawal. This could be achieved by the not unusual 
procedure of making the coming into force of the repeal legislation 
effective through an Order in Council or a statutory instrument 
specifying the appropriate date. But before that stage was in sight, a 
discussion emerged about whether the government could “pull the 
Article 50 trigger” without first obtaining the agreement of the UK 
Parliament. 
II. CONSULTING THE UNITED KINGDOM PARLIAMENT? 
The rights conferred by European law, carried in by the horse of 
the European Communities Act 1972, enure to the benefit of 
European citizens and market participants, according to the content of 
the rights concerned. Although they rode on that proverbial horse, 
they are conferred by EU law itself. While, as observed above,25 
section 18 of the European Union Act 2011 attempted to make UK 
legislation itself the basis of these rights and indeed duties, they are in 
reality founded firmly in EU law itself. The UK Parliament, when 
enacting the European Communities Act 1972, assented to those 
rights and duties having effect within the United Kingdom, but did 
not thereby make that act the source of those rights and duties; the act 
is a vehicle (a horse) rather than the source. Given that Parliament had 
clearly intended EU law to have effect within the United Kingdom, 
should not Parliament have to decide on whether the British 
government should take steps that could lead to those rights and 
duties becoming effective? 
The UK government’s intention to trigger the Article 50 of the 
TFEU mechanism without seeking the prior authority of Parliament 
was challenged in The Queen on the application of Miller et al. v. 
Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union.26 The case came 
before a particularly strong Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench 
Division of the High Court.27 The Divisional Court, as seen above, 
avoided the issue of deciding whether a notification under Article 50 
of the TFEU was reversible. That is itself a question of EU law, and 
                                                                                                             
25.   See European Union Act 2011, supra note 11. 
26.   In the Divisional Court [2016] EWHC 2768 (Admin), upheld on appeal [2017] 
U.K.SC 5 (hereinafter Miller). 
27.   Id. Consisting of the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales (Lord Thomas of 
Cwmgiedd); the Master of the Rolls (Sir Terence Etherton) and Lord Justice Sales. 
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had the court felt it necessary to decide that point in order to give 
judgment, it would have had little choice but to make a reference for a 
preliminary ruling under Article 267 of the TFEU to the ECJ, as there 
is no existing authority on the question. This would have caused 
considerable delay in deciding the case, which would have been 
particularly politically sensitive in view of the rabble rousing in the 
press baying for Brexit rather yesterday than tomorrow. 
The Divisional Court was at pains to emphasize that it was 
dealing with the question of law, and that nothing it said had 
concerned the question of the merits of withdrawal from the European 
Union, nor because government policy is not law did the court’s 
decision have any bearing on government policy.28 Even though the 
European Communities Act 1972 gave effect to the supremacy of EU 
law, and that measure remained the only instance of Parliament 
recognizing a superior form of law than primary legislation, the 
doctrine that Parliament is sovereign and could always repeal primary 
legislation, including the European Communities Act 1972 remained 
unabated. 29  The Royal Prerogative covered only the prerogative 
powers recognized by common law and their exercise produced legal 
effects only within those boundaries; thus, while it did embrace the 
making of treaties, it did not extend to altering or conferring rights 
upon individuals or depriving individuals of rights which they 
enjoyed in domestic law without the intervention of Parliament.30 
The Divisional Court recognized that the European Communities 
Act 1972 was a constitutional statute, approving in particular the 
approach adopted by Lord Justice Laws in Thoburn v. Sunderland 
City Council.31 The Act was not subject to the usual wide principle of 
implied repeal by subsequent legislation; its importance was such that 
could only be repealed or amended by express language and 
subsequent statute or by necessary implication from the provisions of 
such a statute.32 
The key to the discussion in the Divisional Court lies in the 
rights arising under EU law which would be affected by withdrawal 
from the European Union, although that court rightly recognized that 
                                                                                                             
28.   Id. at ¶ 5 of the Divisional Court’s judgment in Miller. 
29.   Id. at ¶. 20—21. 
30.   J.H. Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry [1990] 2 
AC 418 (HL) 500 (per Lord Oliver of Aylmerton). 
31.    [2003] QB 151 (DC) [¶ 62]. 
32.     Divisional Court’s judgment in Miller, supra note 26, at ¶ 44. 
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there were many other a substantial areas of EU law which took effect 
as part of the law of the United Kingdom as directly applicable 
regulations. These rights were analyzed in three categories: 
●  Rights which could be replicated in United Kingdom law. 
These rights could be maintained in whole or in part after the 
withdrawal through re-enactment; this could be done either on an 
individual basis (such as in the area of employee rights) or as part 
of an overall maintenance of existing rights through means of a 
proposed Great Repeal Bill. However, there would be no 
possibility of making a reference to the ECJ about these rights 
after withdrawal. The Divisional Court held that even if such 
rights were to be preserved under new primary legislation within 
the United Kingdom after withdrawal, withdrawal would have 
deprived the domestic law rights created by the European 
Communities Act 1972 of their effect. Moreover, the removal of 
the ability to seek a preliminary ruling from the ECJ under 
Article 267 of the TFEU relating to the scope and interpretation 
of those rights would itself amount to a material change in the 
domestic laws of the United Kingdom.33 
●  Rights which British citizens and companies enjoyed in other 
Member States of the European Union. These are rights of 
residence and the freedoms to pursue economic activities (as 
workers, self-employed, service providers (or recipients), or as 
retirees or students or persons of independent means, and rights 
of companies to establish branches and agencies in other Member 
States). Besides being enforceable in the domestic courts of other 
Member States, these rights could also be invoked by such 
citizens and companies against impedimenta imposed by the 
United Kingdom; again, the enforcement and interpretation of 
those rights could benefit from the procedure of Article 267 of 
the TFEU. The Divisional Court had little difficulty in 
concluding that these rights would be affected by withdrawal, 
and that they were rights which Parliament intended to bring into 
effect through the European Communities Act 1972.34 
●  Rights that could not be replicated in United Kingdom law. 
These rights embraced citizens’ rights, such as the right to vote in 
and stand for elections to the European Parliament, as well as 
broader rights, such as the right to request a court to make a 
reference under Article 267 of the TFEU or to benefit from the 
                                                                                                             
33. Id. at ¶ 64. 
34. Id. at ¶ 66. 
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possibility of persuading the European Commission to take 
action in relation to the enforcement and application of EU law 
within the United Kingdom (for example in relation to 
infringement of competition law or environmental protection 
legislation within the United Kingdom), and to seek appropriate 
remedies. Given that these rights were acknowledged by the 
Secretary of State to be at least in part the product of the 
European Communities Act 1972 the Divisional Court did not 
deal with them further. 
The Divisional Court then proceeded to give the Secretary of 
State a lesson in statutory interpretation of constitutional statutes. In 
situations in which the constitutional principles are strong, the courts 
find that there is a presumption that Parliament intended to legislate in 
conformity with them, and not to undermine them. The text of the 
statute must be read in the light of constitutional principle: could it be 
inferred in the particular context of the primary legislation being 
interpreted that a Parliament, aware of that constitutional principle 
and respectful of it, still intended to produce effects at variance with 
that principle? Although many presumptions could be overridden by 
Parliament if it chose to do so, the stronger the constitutional 
principle, the stronger the presumption that Parliament did not intend 
to override it, and the stronger the requirement of express language or 
clear necessary implication for the inference can be properly drawn 
that Parliament did intend to override it. Likewise, the stronger the 
constitutional principle, the stronger the argument that Parliament’s 
language was intended to reflect that principle. The Secretary of State 
had studiously ignored the constitutional principle that the Crown 
could not vary the law of the land by the exercise of its prerogative 
powers without the authority of Parliament.35 In view of the important 
and far-reaching step that Parliament had taken in switching on the 
direct effect of EU law in the UK legal systems by enacting the 
European Communities Act 1972, the Divisional Court felt it not 
plausible to suppose that Parliament intended that the Crown should 
be able to switch off direct effect again simply by unilateral action 
using prerogative powers. Furthermore, the status of the European 
Communities Act 1972, as a constitutional statute, was such that 
Parliament is taken to have indicated that it should be exempt from 
the operational usual doctrine of implied repeal by subsequent 
inconsistent legislation; it was all the more unlikely that Parliament 
                                                                                                             
35.  Id. at ¶¶ 82—85. 
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intended that the rights thereby conferred could be revoked by the 
unilateral use of prerogative powers.36 
The Divisional Court concluded that in the light of the above it 
was clear that Parliament intended to legislate by the European 
Communities Act 1972 to introduce EU law into domestic law and to 
create the rights in the second category, which could not be undone 
by the exercise of Crown prerogative powers. Rights from the first 
and third categories, as well as the wider rights in the second 
category, also depended on the continued existence of the European 
Communities Act 1972, which had brought them into domestic law.37 
The press reaction to this judgment essentially called a lynch 
mob against the distinguished judges involved, and regrettably, 
several politicians were lukewarm (to say the least) in their support 
for the independence of the judiciary—a phenomenon also currently 
evident in the United States. Unsurprisingly, the Secretary of State 
appealed to the UK Supreme Court. Prior to the hearing, there were 
clear attempts to intimidate some of the Justices into recusing 
themselves, but the Supreme Court very wisely took the view that 
such a step was unnecessary – the activities did not affect their 
judicial independence – and decided to hear the case en banc. Again, 
the Justices rightly stressed that their judgment had nothing to do with 
the political wisdom of Brexit. 
The majority of the Supreme Court, formed by eight out of the 
eleven Justices, 38  took the view that although the European 
Communities Act 1972 gave effect to EU law, it was not the 
originating source of that law.39 The majority spoke of that Act as a 
conduit,40 which is a slightly different metaphor than that of the horse 
invoked above, although nothing turns on the distinction, and the 
                                                                                                             
36.   Id. at ¶¶ 86—88. 
37.   Id. at ¶ 92. The Divisional Court then summarized the background to its conclusion 
in paragraphs 93—94 of its judgment. It then turned to deal with the applicants’ arguments, 
concluding that in reality the Secretary of State was proposing to take away the rights of 
citizens given effect by Parliament through the use of prerogative powers. The final parts of 
the judgment discussed other issues that did not affect the conclusion. 
38.  Lord Neuberger (President); Lady Hale (Vice President); Lord Mance; Lord Kerr; 
Lord Clarke; Lord Wilson; Lord Sumption, and Lord Hodge. 
39.  The Queen on the application of Miller et al v. Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5, [62]—[65]. 
40.  Id. at ¶ 65 (echoing the metaphor used by John Finnis in his Sir Thomas Moore 
Lecture in 2016; accessible at http://www.lincolnsinn.org.U.K./images/word/education/
Sir%20Thomas%20More%20Lecture%20-%20Professor%20John%20Finnis%20FBA.pdf 
(delivered after the judgment of the Divisional Court discussed above). 
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horse could not be said to be in any way unruly. The majority 
examined the categories of rights identified by the Divisional Court 
and concluded that given that it was clear that some of the rights in 
first category would be lost on the United Kingdom withdrawing from 
the European Union, it was unnecessary to consider whether the 
applicants could rely on the loss of rights in the second and third 
categories. The majority took the view that if they could not succeed 
in their argument based on loss of rights in the first category, then 
invoking loss of rights in the other categories would not help, and if 
they could succeed on the basis of loss of rights in the first category, 
they would not need to invoke loss of rights in the other categories.41 
The majority took the view that the loss of the source of law which 
would result from withdrawal was a fundamental legal change which 
justified the conclusion that prerogative powers could not be invoked 
to withdraw from the EU Treaties. The majority also upheld the 
Divisional Court’s view that the changes in domestic rights acquired 
through EU law was another, albeit related, ground for justifying that 
conclusion. The consequences of withdrawal went further than 
affecting the rights acquired pursuant to Section 2 of the European 
Communities Act 1972. That Act envisaged domestic law, and 
therefore rights of UK citizens, changing as EU law varies, but it did 
not envisage those rights changing as a result of ministers unilaterally 
deciding that the United Kingdom should withdraw from the EU 
Treaties.42 The effect of the European Communities Act 1972 was 
that ministers required the authority of Parliament before giving 
notice of the United Kingdom’s intention to withdraw,43 a conclusion 
that was unaffected by subsequent legislation or by the referendum of 
2016; in any event, deciding on whether to act on the result of the 
referendum was a matter for Parliament.44 
                                                                                                             
41.   The Queen on the application of Miller et al v. Secretary of State for Exiting the 
European Union [2017] UKSC 5 at ¶ 73. 
42.   Id. at ¶ 83. 
43.   Id. at ¶ 101. 
44.   See id. at ¶ 116—25. The remaining part of the majority judgment dealt with 
issues relating to Northern Ireland, and devolution: the majority in the Supreme Court 
concluded that the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly did not have a legal veto over 
withdrawal from the European Union, nor did the Northern Ireland Assembly. Id. at ¶¶ 135, 
150. The “Sewell Convention” that the United Kingdom Parliament would not normally 
legislate with regard to devolved matters without the consent of the devolved Parliaments was 
considered to be a political convention, rather than a rule that was justiciable. Id. at ¶¶ 136—
51. The three dissenting judgments can be briefly summarized. Lord Reed, whose minority 
judgment was the most extensively reasoned, felt that the effect that Parliament had given to 
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This sensible approach recognizes that EU law itself is a 
dynamic body of law, which is constantly developing. The Treaties 
are the skeletons on which flesh is constructed by the acts of the 
Union institutions, and the skeletons are extended by the Member 
States through Treaty amendments. The rights and obligations 
brought into being by EU law were never intended to be static, and 
they have developed through the years as the ECJ looks at the present 
state of Union law at the snapshot moment of a judgment. 
It was clear that the UK government had to go back to 
Parliament. It did so, and after an initial rebellion in the House of 
Lords, the notably brief European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) 
Act 2017 received the Royal Assent on March 16, 2017. Parliament 
thus granted permission to ministers to trigger the Article 50 of the 
TFEU mechanism. 
III. THE PROCESS STARTS 
On March 29, 2016, Theresa May wrote to Donald Tusk, the 
President of the European Council notifying body in accordance with 
Article 50(2) of the TEU of the United Kingdom’s intention to 
withdraw from the European Union and, on the same basis, as applied 
by Article 106a of the Euratom Treaty,45 from the European Atomic 
Energy Community.46 Certain points expressed in this letter are of 
particular (largely political) interest: the expression about the deep 
                                                                                                             
EU law in U.K. domestic law by virtue of the European Communities Act 1972 was inherently 
conditional on the application of the EU treaties to the U.K. and thus on the latter’s 
membership of the Union. He argued that that Act did not affect the Crown’s exercise of 
prerogative powers in respect of membership. Since, in his view, no alteration in the 
fundamental rule governing the recognition of sources of law had resulted from membership of 
the EU, or would result from notification under Article 50 TFEU, Ministers were entitled to 
give notification under Article 50 in the exercise of prerogative powers, without requiring 
authorization by a further Act of Parliament. Lord Carnwath, agreeing with Lord Reed, felt 
that the Divisional Court took too narrow a view of the constitutional principles involved; he 
argued that although the Article 50 TFEU process involved a partnership between Parliament 
and executive, that did not mean that legislation was required simply to initiate it, although 
legislation would be required to implement withdrawal. That process, including the form and 
timing of any legislation could and should be determined by Parliament not by the courts. Lord 
Hughes delivered a brief judgment, agreeing with Lord Reed. 
45.   See Consolidated version of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community, 2016 O.J. C 203/01 [hereinafter Euratom Treaty]. 
46.   Letter from Theresa May, Prime Minister, United Kingdom, to Donald Tusk, 
President, European Council (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.gov.U.K./government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/604079/Prime_Ministers_letter_to_European_Council_Pr
esident_Donald_Tusk.pdf. 
1192 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:4 
and special partnership the United Kingdom hopes to enjoy – as the 
European Union’s closest friend and neighbor – with the European 
Union after leaving it; the proposal for constructive and respectful 
engagement in a spirit of sincere cooperation; the importance of 
striking early agreement about the rights of citizens of the other 
twenty-seven Member States living in the United Kingdom and of the 
UK citizens living in the other twenty-seven Member States; the 
importance of economic and security co-operation; the importance of 
working together to minimize disruption and give as much certainty 
as possible; the importance of special attention to the United 
Kingdom’s unique relationship with Ireland and the importance of the 
peace process in Northern Ireland; the suggestion that the technical 
talks on detailed policy areas should begin soon as possible with the 
biggest challenges prioritized; and an intention to continue to work 
together to advance and protect European values. One particular 
element that attracted attention in relation to the deep and special 
partnership was that it would take in both economic and security of 
cooperation. In some circles this was interpreted as a thinly veiled 
threat that if there were no agreement on economic matters, there 
would be none on security cooperation, although this impression was 
fortunately quickly dispelled.47 
The immediate reaction of Donald Tusk48 in part reflected these 
issues, but also made it clear that the European Union had other 
concerns as well. Tusk stressed, first, the European Union’s duty to 
minimise the uncertainty and disruption caused by the United 
Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the European Union for EU 
citizens, businesses, and Member States. This would essentially be 
about damage control. Putting people first, he emphasized the need to 
settle the status and situations of EU citizens in the United Kingdom 
after the withdrawal with reciprocal, enforceable, and non-
discriminatory guarantees. It would also be important to address the 
legal vacuum for companies arising from the fact that after Brexit the 
EU laws would no longer apply to the United Kingdom. The third 
point he made was that the European Union would also need to make 
sure that the United Kingdom honoured all financial commitments 
                                                                                                             
47.   See Joe Watts, Brexit: Theresa May forced into embarrassing climbdown over 
Article 50 negotiations security ‘threat’, INDEPENDENT (Mar., 31, 2017), 
http://www.independent.co.U.K./news/U.K./politics/brexit-theresa-may-article-50-
negotiations-security-threat-latest-leave-eu-european-union-a7659466.html. 
48.   See Letter from Theresa May to Donald Tusk, supra note 46. 
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and liabilities it had made and taken as a Member State. The logic 
behind this point lies in the multiannual commitments made in respect 
of policies such as research, agriculture, and regional, economic, and 
social cohesion, where all twenty-eight Member States made financial 
commitments. Tusk emphasized that the European Union, on its part, 
would honour all its commitments. The fourth point was the 
commitment to seek flexible and creative solutions aiming at avoiding 
a hard border between Northern Ireland and Ireland; supporting the 
peace process in Northern Ireland was crucial. Tusk observed that 
these four issues formed part of the first phase of the negotiations, and 
only once sufficient progress on the withdrawal had been achieved 
could the framework for the future relationship between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom commence. Tusk rejected, therefore, 
the idea of starting parallel talks on all issues at the same time. This is 
actually scarcely surprising, as accession negotiations proceed on a 
chapter-by-chapter basis, and not all chapter negotiations take place at 
the same time. The wording of Article 50(2) leaves this point 
somewhat up in the air: “the Union shall negotiate and conclude an 
agreement with [the withdrawing] State setting out the arrangements 
for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future 
relationship with the Union.” While the choice for a single phase or 
two-phase set of negotiations is essentially political, it is tidier, and 
reflects the view that the withdrawal treaty should be a separate 
document from any treaty on the future relationship between the 
European Union and the withdrawing State; otherwise, the resulting 
document would be messy in the extreme. 
The Council’s Task Force established under leadership of Didier 
Seeuws was well prepared, and the draft European Council guidelines 
under Article 50(2) were made public on March 31, 2017.49 These 
draft guidelines unsurprisingly dovetail with very many of the 
observations already made by President Tusk. Those draft guidelines, 
with only minor changes, were approved at the Special Meeting of the 
European Council on April 29, 2017. 50  On May 3, 2017, the 
                                                                                                             
49.  GENERAL SECRETARIAT OF THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Council Document 21001/17, Bxt 5, (Mar. 31 2017), http://g8fip1kplyr33r3krz5b97d1. 
wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FullText.pdf. 
        50.  Eur. Council Document EUCO XT 20004/17, http://data.consilium.europa.eu/
doc/document/XT-20004-2017-INIT/en/pdf. 
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Commission presented its recommendation for a Council Decision 
authorizing it to open negotiations relating to U.K. withdrawal.51 
The guidelines emphasise the European Council’s wish to have 
the United Kingdom as a close partner in future, and they make it 
plain that any agreement with the United Kingdom must be based on 
the balance of rights and obligations and ensure a level playing field. 
In this, the integrity of the single market assumes major importance: 
participation based on a sector-by-sector approach is rejected, so there 
will be no cherry picking. In line with this approach, the negotiations 
will be conducted as a single package on the principle that nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed (a principle that the European Union 
applies in all its negotiations, even though individual chapters in the 
negotiations are closed once de facto agreement on them has been 
reached), so individual items will not be settled separately. From the 
European Union’s point of view, the negotiations will be conducted 
with unified positions, with no separate negotiations between the 
Member States and the United Kingdom on matters pertaining to its 
withdrawal from the European Union; this is clearly designed to stop 
Member States being open to being “bought.” While the European 
Union intends to be constructive throughout and find an agreement 
that is fair and equitable for all Member States and in the interests of 
the Union’s citizens, which is in the best interest of both sides, the 
guidelines make it clear that the European Union will also take steps 
to be able to cope if the negotiations were to fail. 
The phased approach emphasized by Tusk is also reflected in 
point 4 of the guidelines, as is the view that the United Kingdom must 
first become a third country before the arrangements on a future 
relationship with the European Union can be concluded. Given the 
wording of Article 50 of the TEU, an overall understanding on the 
framework for future relationship could be identified during the 
second phase of the negotiations under Article 50, so the European 
Union will be ready to engage in preliminary and preparatory 
discussions on that in the context of the negotiations under Article 50 
once the European Council decides that sufficient progress has been 
made in the first stage towards reaching a satisfactory agreement on 
the arrangements for an orderly withdrawal. 
Point 6 of the guidelines leaves open the possibility of 
negotiating transitional arrangements, provided that they are in the 
                                                                                                             
51.  Commission Document COM (2017) 218 final. 
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interest of the European Union, and, that they form appropriate 
bridges towards the foreseeable framework for the future relationship. 
As with transitional arrangements negotiated in relation to accession 
agreements, such arrangements would have to be clearly defined, 
limited in time, and with effective enforcement mechanisms. If a 
time-limited prolongation of the EU acquis52 were to be considered, 
existing EU regulatory, budgetary, supervisory, judiciary and 
enforcement instruments and structures would have to apply during 
that prolongation. 
In addition to the common points already highlighted in the letter 
from May and Tusk’s reaction (citizens’ rights, companies, and EU-
funded programs and financial issues), the guidelines stress the need 
for a single financial settlement covering all legal and budgetary 
commitments, as well as liabilities, including contingent liabilities. 
The guidelines also note the importance of supporting the peace 
process in Northern Ireland and, moreover, the aim of avoiding a hard 
border on the island of Ireland, while respecting the integrity of the 
European Union’s legal order. They envisage that existing bilateral 
agreements and arrangements between the United Kingdom and 
Ireland that are compatible with EU law should also be recognized. 
The remaining points deal with arrangements as regards the sovereign 
base areas of the United Kingdom on Cyprus: the consequences of 
international commitments which the United Kingdom has contracted 
in the context of its EU membership, with a possible common 
approach towards third country partners and international 
organizations, and arrangements for the facilitation of transfer of seats 
of EU agencies and facilities located in the United Kingdom 
(although this is actually a matter for the twenty-seven Member States 
rather than for the European Union itself). 
Of major interest to lawyers are points 16 and 17 of the 
guidelines. Point 16 considers questions relating to ensuring legal 
certainty and equal treatment for all court procedures pending before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU,” i.e., the ECJ 
itself or the General Court) on the date of withdrawal that involve the 
United Kingdom or natural or legal persons there. The guidelines 
envisage that institution remaining competent to adjudicate in those 
procedures. Arrangements should also be agreed for administrative 
                                                                                                             
52.   I.e. a continuation of the status quo. Whether that would mean application of 
developments in the period of the transitional arrangements (as EU law is dynamic) would be 
the subject of negotiation, although it is difficult to envisage from the U.K.’s viewpoint. 
1196 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40:4 
procedures pending before the Commission and the EU agencies at 
the date of withdrawal, involving the United Kingdom or natural or 
legal persons there, as well as for the possibility of administrative or 
court proceedings initiated after withdrawal in respect of facts that 
occurred before the withdrawal date. Point 17 addresses the need for 
appropriate dispute settlement mechanisms regarding the application 
and interpretation of the withdrawal agreement, as well as duly 
circumscribed institutional arrangements allowing for the adoption of 
measures necessary to deal with situations not foreseen in the 
withdrawal agreement. The European Union’s interest in effectively 
protecting its autonomy and its legal order, including the role of the 
Court of Justice, will have to be borne in mind. 
The remainder of the guidelines set out a number of essentially 
political and economic points the brevity of which is almost in inverse 
proportion to their political importance. Understandably, the 
European Council welcomes and shares the United Kingdom’s desire 
to establish close partnership between the European Union and the 
United Kingdom after its departure; though this will not offer the 
same benefits as EU membership, strong constructive ties are 
regarded as remaining in both sides’ interests and should involve 
more than just trade. Given that the British government had indicated 
that it would not wish to remain in the single market but would like to 
pursue an ambitious free-trade agreement with the European Union, 
the European Council stated that it was ready to initiate work for such 
an agreement, to be finalized and concluded once the United 
Kingdom is no longer a Member State. Any free trade agreement 
would have to be balanced, ambitious, and wide-ranging, but it could 
not amount to participation in the single market or parts thereof, as 
that would undermine its integrity and proper functioning. Any 
agreement would have to ensure a level playing field in terms of 
competition and state aid, and would have to encompass safeguards 
against unfair competitive advantages through inter alia tax, social, 
environmental and regulatory measures and practices. Beyond trade, 
the European Union was ready to consider establishing partnership in 
other areas, in particular the fight against terrorism and international 
crime as well as security, defense and foreign policy. The future 
partnership would have to include appropriate enforcement and 
dispute settlement mechanisms that did not affect the European 
Union’s autonomy, in particular its decision-making procedures. 
Finally, the guidelines make clear that after the United Kingdom 
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leaves the European Union, no agreement between the European 
Union and the United Kingdom could apply to Gibraltar without 
agreement between Spain and the United Kingdom. This last point 
already caused something of a furor in certain circles in early April 
2017 in the United Kingdom and in Spain, with some UK politicians 
making rather unwise statements in a high and loud, even jingoistic 
tone.53 
On May 22, 2017, the Council adopted a decision setting out the 
negotiating mandate,54 the terms of which address the first aspect of 
the negotiations, the terms of withdrawal; a further negotiating 
mandate will in due course address the issue of the future relationship 
between the European Union and the United Kingdom. The 
negotiating mandate follows closely the guidelines set out above. 
Negotiations finally commenced on June 19, 2017. 
IV. HOW TO WRIGGLE OUT, AND HENRY VIII POWERS 
The UK government has now finally published its White Paper 
on legislating for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the 
European Union.55 The White Paper heralds the introduction in due 
course of a so-called Great Repeal Bill that is designed to ensure that 
generally the same rules and laws will apply after the United 
Kingdom leaves the European Union as before. The Great Repeal Bill 
will repeal the European Community 1972 and convert EU law as it 
stands at the moment of withdrawal from the European Union into 
UK law before the United Kingdom actually leaves the European 
Union; this is designed to ensure there is no overnight change in 
rights and obligations for individuals and businesses. It is also 
designed to ensure that the UK Parliament and, where appropriate, the 
devolved legislatures in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland can 
make such changes as they feel appropriate at any time after the 
United Kingdom has left the European Union. The Great Repeal Bill 
will convert directly applicable EU law into UK law, thus ensuring 
                                                                                                             
53.    BRITISH BROADCASTING CORPORATION, Brexit and Gibraltar: May laughs 
off Spain ‘war’ talk (Apr. 3 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-39475127. 
         54.   The Council Decision and Annex (which contains the details) have surprisingly not 
yet been published in the O.J., see http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-
releases/2017/05/22-brexit-negotiating-directives/andCouncilDocuments21009/17 
BXT16and21009/17BXT16ADD1REV2. 
         55.  SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXITING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Legislating 
for the United Kingdom’s Withdrawal from the European Union, 2017, CM 9446 (UK). 
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that there is no void resulting from present EU regulations no longer 
being applicable in the United Kingdom. Those laws that have been 
made in the United Kingdom in order to implement obligations 
imposed by measures such as EU directives (which have to be 
transposed into national law) will be preserved. Usually such 
implementation was on the basis of Section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972, which empowered ministers, including those 
in devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, 
to adopt secondary legislation to implement EU obligations. On the 
repeal of that Act, legislation adopted by virtue of that Act would 
cease to apply, unless preserved (in this instance) by the Great Repeal 
Act. 
The White Paper goes on to make it clear that the EU Treaties as 
they exist at the moment the United Kingdom will leave the European 
Union may well assist in the interpretation of the EU laws which the 
United Kingdom intends to preserve. It is intended that directly 
effective Treaty rights for individuals will be incorporated into UK 
law. While the CJEU itself will no longer have jurisdiction affecting 
the United Kingdom, and the existing obligation on the judiciary to 
follow its case law will disappear, the White Paper intends to ensure 
continuity in how European Union law is interpreted before and after 
withdrawal day. The Great Repeal Bill will provide that any question 
as to the meaning of EU-derived UK law is to be determined in the 
UK courts by reference to the CJEU’s case law as it exists on the day 
that the United Kingdom withdraws from the European Union. CJEU 
case law on any aspect of EU law that is not be converted into UK 
law would not need to be applied by the UK courts. The value of such 
CJEU case law as a binding precedent will be the same as that of 
decisions of the UK Supreme Court.56 The British government states 
that it would expect the Supreme Court to take a similar approach to 
departing from CJEU case law to that which it takes when departing 
from its own, and is examining whether it might be desirable for any 
                                                                                                             
56.  UK Supreme Court Practice Statement 3 https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/
practice-direction-03.pdf (last visited May 9, 2017) states: “The Supreme Court has not re-
issued the House of Lords’ Practice Statement of 26 July 1966 (Practice Statement (Judicial 
Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234) which stated that the House of Lords would treat former 
decisions of the House as normally binding but that it would depart from a previous decision 
when it appeared right to do so. The Practice Statement is “part of the established 
jurisprudence relating to the conduct of appeals” and “has as much effect in [the Supreme] 
Court as it did before the Appellate Committee in the House of Lords”: Austin v Mayor and 
Burgesses of the London Borough of Southwark [2010] UKSC 28, [24]—[25]. 
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additional steps to take to give further clarity about the circumstances 
in which such departure might occur. Parliament would in any event 
be free to change the law and overturn case law if it felt fit. 
The White Paper also proposes that where a conflict arises 
between EU-derived UK law and primary legislation passed by 
Parliament after UK withdrawal from the European Union, the new 
legislation will take precedence over the EU-derived UK law that has 
been preserved by the Great Repeal Bill. This is the logical result of 
the supremacy of EU law in the event of a conflict with national law 
no longer applying in the United Kingdom. In relation to the 
European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, 57  the British 
government’s intention is that removal of the Charter from UK law 
will not affect the substantive rights which individuals already benefit 
from in the United Kingdom. Article 51 of the Charter states that it 
“does not extend the field of application of Union law beyond the 
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the 
Union, or modify powers and tasks as defined in the Treaties.” Many 
of those rights exists elsewhere in the body of EU law which will be 
converted into UK law, and others already exist in UK law or in 
international agreements to which the United Kingdom is a party. 
Given that EU law would be converted into UK law by the Great 
Repeal Bill, it will continue to be interpreted by UK courts 
consistently with the underlying rights which will be preserved. If 
pre-withdrawal case law has been decided by reference to such 
underlying rights, that case law will continue to be relevant as 
explained above; but is insofar as case-law refers to the Charter, those 
references will be considered as referring only to the underlying 
rights, rather than the Charter. 
Chapter 3 of the White Paper contains the most controversial 
aspect of the British government’s proposal, referring to delegated 
powers. These powers are often referred to as Henry VIII powers,58 
after the Statute of Proclamations 1539. Section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972 is itself a Henry VIII clause, giving ministers 
the power to implement non-directly applicable EU law. But as it 
relates to implementing EU legislation which has already passed 
                                                                                                             
57.   2016 O.J. C 20/ 389. 
58.    Joelle Grogan, Rights for the chop: how a Henry VIII clause in the Great Repeal 
Bill will undermine democracy, Lsᴇ Bʀᴇxɪᴛ’s Bʟᴏɢ, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2016/11/30/
rights-for-the-chop-how-a-henry-viii-clause-in-the-great-repeal-bill-will-undermine-
democracy/ (for a useful and clear discussion.). 
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democratic scrutiny at EU level and, at least in more recent years will 
also have been open to national parliamentary level scrutiny at the 
proposal stage, it is inherently less far-reaching than the proposals in 
the Great Repeal Bill. The problem identified by the British 
government is that there will be where some areas where converted 
law will be unable to operate because the United Kingdom is no 
longer a member of the European Union; there will also be cases 
where EU law will cease to operate as intended or will be redundant 
after withdrawal. Where EU rights are based on reciprocal 
arrangements, it may no longer be practical or in the United 
Kingdom’s interests to maintain them unilaterally, if no reciprocal 
continuity can be established as part of the new relationship between 
the European Union and the United Kingdom. 
The White Paper recognizes the need for justification of the 
choice to use secondary rather than primary legislation, and suggests 
that justifications include: matters which cannot be known or may be 
liable to change at the point when the primary legislation is being 
passed because the government needs to allow for the progress of 
negotiations; adjustments to policy that are directly consequential on 
the withdrawal from the EU; and to provide a level of detail not sort 
appropriate for primary legislation. The White Paper also recognizes 
the need for some limitations on the powers of ministers, not least 
because it intends to use these powers in relation to primary as well as 
secondary legislation which implements current EU obligations as 
well as directly applicable EU law that will be converted into 
domestic law on withdrawal. The government also intends to include 
the power to transfer to UK bodies or ministers those powers that are 
contained in EU-derived UK law and which are currently exercised 
by EU bodies, although the White Paper argues that this does not 
mean that the power will be wide in terms of legislation to which it 
can be used to make changes. The White Paper envisages that the 
power will not be available where the government wishes to make a 
policy change which is not designed to deal with deficiencies in 
preserved EU-derived UK law arising out of withdrawal from the EU. 
Moreover, the government states that it will consider the constraints 
placed on the delegated power in section 2 of the European 
Communities Act 1972 to assess whether similar constraints may be 
suitable for the new power (for example, preventing it from being 
used to make retrospective provision or impose taxation). The White 
Paper argues that if the power is too narrowly drafted, then too many 
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of the changes will have to be enacted through primary legislation 
before withdrawal, which would lead to an enormous crowding of 
Parliamentary time. The government proposes to use existing types of 
statutory procedure, which allow Parliament to see all statutory 
instruments under various levels of security. The most commonly 
used procedures are the negative procedure (the measure is agreed if 
no objection requiring a debate and possibly even a vote is lodged by 
a member of either House of Parliament within a set period) and the 
affirmative procedure, which requires debate and approval by both 
Houses of Parliament before either measure can enter into force. 
Moreover, Parliamentary committees scrutinize statutory instruments 
for technical and policy content. 
Mindful of the furor that the use of Henry VIII powers would 
create, the government sees the White Paper as the beginning of 
discussion between government and Parliament as to the most 
pragmatic and effective approach to take in this area. The government 
envisages that the corrections made by the statutory instruments will 
have to be in place before the United Kingdom leaves the European 
Union, and thus proposes that the power in the Great Repeal Bill will 
come into force as soon as the Royal Assent is granted, so that the 
process of correcting the statute book can begin immediately. Finally, 
as most of the corrections can and will need to be made before the 
United Kingdom leaves the European Union, the powers proposed in 
the Great Repeal Bill will be time-limited to enact the necessary 
changes. The White Paper also holds out the carrot of more powers 
being devolved to Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in 
accordance with the (unstated) principle of subsidiarity, so as to 
ensure that power sits closer to the people. Devolved ministers would 
be granted similar Henry VIII powers to amend devolved legislation 
in order to correct a law that would no longer operate appropriately 
after withdrawal from the European Union. Last, but not least, the 
White Paper makes it plain that the UK government will take 
appropriate steps to engage with the Crown Dependencies and 
Overseas Territories in so far as necessary. 
It remains to be seen to what extent the UK Parliament will 
accept such a far-reaching use of delegated powers, but first reactions 
have been understandably very negative. Those on the Eurosceptic 
right who have long clamored that there is not enough national 
parliamentary scrutiny of EU legislation are hardly going to be 
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impressed by attempts to restrict parliamentary scrutiny of legislative 
action by UK ministers. 
V. CRYSTAL BALL SCENARIOS? 
The key problems are likely to center around the extent, if any, 
to which the United Kingdom will retain access to the internal market 
of the European Union. One obvious way to do this would have been 
to change the United Kingdom’s participation in the European 
Economic Area Agreement59  (“EEA Agreement”) from a Member 
State party to a non-member state party, assuming that the other 
signatories would agree to such a course.60 This approach foundered 
on the political obstacle that access to the internal market under the 
EEA Agreement comes with a price, which unlike ancient Gaul, is in 
two parts. The first element is that the United Kingdom would have to 
continually adjust its legislation to reflect changes in the European 
Union’s internal market legislation (to ensure continued 
homogeneity), without having a vote at the table in the decision-
making process regarding that legislation. The second element is that 
the United Kingdom would be called upon to make a financial 
contribution to the EU budget just as the other non-member state 
signatories of the EEA Agreement have agreed to do. The UK 
government has evidently ruled out such an approach. 
The chosen scenario is that the United Kingdom could seek to 
have a comprehensive free trade agreement with the European Union. 
Free trade agreements can come in varying forms, but they have 
tended at least to deal with the free movement of goods and services, 
and may even embrace other internal market freedoms. One of the 
problems with free trade agreements is that they do not seek to 
achieve the same degree of integration as the original EEC Treaty, or 
now the TFEU does, and that the case law applicable to identically 
worded provisions of the EEC Treaty, now of the TFEU, cannot be 
imported into the meaning of the free-trade agreement.61 Since then, 
                                                                                                             
59.  1994 O.J. L 1/3. 
60.  See Dòra Sif Tynes & Elisabeth Lian Haugsdal, In, Out or in-between? The U.K. as 
a contracting party to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 40 EUR. L. REV. 753, 
764 (2016) (explaining that this would involve amending the EEA Treaty (or withdrawing and 
re-acceding) and the United Kingdom rejoining the European Free Trade Association, which it 
had left on accession to the European Union). 
61.  See e.g. Polydor Ltd. et al. v. Harlequin Record Shops et al., Case C-270/80, [1982] 
E.C.R. I-339, ¶¶ 16-18 (concerning the interpretation of the EEC Treaty). 
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however, the ECJ has been able to achieve a similar result by 
interpreting a free trade agreement in the light of its purpose, at least 
where it was obvious that the Member State concerned already had all 
the relevant information on the pharmaceutical product being 
reimported.62 When the EEA Agreement was concluded, the scope of 
EU legislation dealing, for example, with free movement of workers, 
was expressly extended to cover nationals of the non-member state 
EEA countries. This was done so that the ECJ could not use the 
different integration argument to deny direct effect to the rights 
created. A similar approach could be taken in the context of a 
comprehensive free trade agreement with the United Kingdom. 
Given that paranoia about immigration was a major factor in the 
referendum campaign, it may be thought that any agreement on the 
free movement of workers in particular would be a matter of some 
controversy on the right wing of the Conservative party and in UKIP 
circles. However, the sort of arrangements envisaged in the ill-fated 
Settlement with the United Kingdom might provide some inspiration 
as part of a mutually satisfactory solution in this area. A particular 
variety of free trade has been achieved between the European Union 
and Switzerland, which have concluded a series of agreements 
relating to different aspects of the classic internal market: goods, 
services, workers, establishment, capital, and payments, as well as 
agreements on transport and other issues. With Switzerland, a poison 
pill clause in the more recent series of agreements provides that the 
consequence of failing to ratify the latest in the series of agreements 
would be the collapse of rights granted under the previous 
agreements. This is an incentive to vote for them in referendums, 
which are commonplace in Switzerland. A similar clause could be 
included in agreements with the United Kingdom if it were to follow 
this route. However, it is now unlikely that this route will be 
followed, given that both the United Kingdom and the European 
Union appear to favor a single comprehensive and far-reaching 
solution. 
The United Kingdom has ruled out trying to remain part of the 
customs union aspects of the European Union, but, as seen above in 
the discussion of the United Kingdom’s notification of withdrawal 
and the reaction by Donald Tusk and in the draft guidelines from the 
                                                                                                             
62.  See e.g. Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Bundesgesundheitsamt, Case C-207/91, [1993] 
E.C.R. I-3723, ¶¶ 15—26. 
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European Council, this gives rise to the Irish problem.63 Ireland will 
remain a Member State of the European Union, and thus of the 
customs union; this would imply that there would have to be controls 
on goods at the land border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, as 
well as controls between Great Britain and Ireland. The land border is 
nothing new: it has always existed, as have the unauthorized roads, 
but even at the height of the Troubles, there were no systematic 
passport checks on people moving from one side and borders of the 
other. When Ireland became independent, it was agreed that a 
common travel area would exist between it and the United Kingdom, 
a state of affairs that still exists independently of the rights created by 
membership of the European Union. 
If the United Kingdom is no longer a Member State of the 
European Union, there will need to be controls on the movement of 
goods between the two States, a scenario to which no one looks 
forward. When one builds fences, or strengthens borders, one 
stimulates smuggling, tunneling, and more. 64  Given that neither 
Ireland nor the United Kingdom is in the Schengen Area, no problem 
arises on that score. However, the common travel area does pose 
problems, as nationals of other Member States can come into Ireland 
freely, but would have no right to reside in the United Kingdom, 
unless that were to be negotiated reciprocally as part of the Brexit 
deal or later. The idea of British immigration officers checking 
passengers arriving in Ireland, alongside Irish officials, is not 
necessarily assured of a welcome reception in Dublin. There are 
though ready precedents: French authorities check travelers using the 
Eurostar service from London to the Continent, and British officials 
do the same at the Paris and Brussels terminals. A customs union with 
the European Union might have been able to solve many issues on 
trade in goods, but there would still be questions of rules of origin to 
deal with, as well as dumping, and the problems as to persons would 
still be there. The customs union with Turkey has been fraught with 
difficulties for many years, and at WTO level it effectively means that 
                                                                                                             
63.   See Brian Doherty, John Temple Lang, Christopher McCrudden, Lee McGowan, 
David Phinnemore & Dagmar Shiek, Northern Ireland and Brexit: the European Economic 
Area Option, (Apr. 7, 2017), http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_7576_
northernirelandandbrexit.pdf (addressing the prospects for Northern Ireland to become part of 
the EEA). 
64.   See e.g. Pigs & Bacon Commission v. McCarren & Co. Ltd., Case C-177/78, 
[1979] E.C.R. 2161. 
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the Turks have relatively little to say about trade policy, concessions, 
hanging to a considerable extent on the coattails of the European 
Union, much to the dissatisfaction of the Turks. While the United 
Kingdom could have chosen simply continue to apply by 
incorporation the European Union’s customs legislation as part of the 
conversion program envisaged under the Great Repeal Bill, and align 
itself entirely with the European Union in these matters, the Queen’s 
Speech at the State Opening of Parliament on June 21, 2017 made it 
clear that a separate Customs Bill would form part of a package of 
measures designed to achieve Brexit, and the term “Great Repeal 
Bill” made way for the simpler term “Repeal Bill”, with a series of 
specialist satellite Bills.65 
A solution, under which Northern Ireland would leave the 
United Kingdom and become independent, or even part of Ireland on 
a federal or confederal basis with religious toleration and freedom 
ensured, seems as yet unachievable (no matter how economically 
desirable either course might be). Yet old prejudices, when examined 
closely, sometimes do not stand up to scrutiny, and political 
desirability can triumph apparent religious interests. At the Battle of 
the Boyne, King William, the Protestant King, carried Papal support 
into battle. Success for James III would have meant agrandissement 
of his supporter, Louis XIV, with whom the Pope was having a 
classic row about control of the Catholic Church in France; the Pope 
therefore supported the Protestant King against the Catholic King. 
Given that neither the Northern Irish nor the Irish politicians want a 
serious land border to return, as it might threaten the peace process, 
the stimulus to think out of the box is enormous. The importance of 
this aspect has been rightly highlighted in Theresa May’s letter 
notifying the European Union of the United Kingdom’s intention to 
withdraw from the European Union, and in the European Union’s 
reactions discussed above. 
Finally, Brexit could well lead to the break-up of the United 
Kingdom, if Scotland and/or Northern Ireland were to leave it after a 
referendum and a settlement. Either or both would most likely seek to 
accede to the European Union. That brings its own complications, as 
Spain has hitherto not been seeking to reward secession, for fear of 
                                                                                                             
65. See THE QUEEN’S SPEECH AND ASSOCIATED BACKGROUND BRIEFING, 
ON THE OCCASION OF THE OPENING OF PARLIAMENT ON WEDNESDAY 21 JUNE 
2017 (2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/
620838/Queens_speech_2017_background_notes.pdf, at 17, et seq. 
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encouraging would-be separatists in Spain, although some flexibility 
might develop. In any event, there is no guarantee that Scotland 
and/or Northern Ireland would be at the head of the queue to accede. 
Another, perhaps less welcome, aspect is that a proliferation of very 
small new Member States is likely to lead to Balkanization, with all 
the problems that that would entail. Decision-making with a huge 
number of Member States would need to be seriously reformed along 
federal lines, and simplified. At the moment, this may well be 
politically difficult, given the attractions of those who want the power 
of decision to be nearer the people affected by it. However, many 
things are simply more effectively considered and effected at a higher 
level than the Nation State. Putting Ruritania first may not always be 
a recipe for success in the long term. 
The final obvious course of action, if a deal cannot be agreed for 
preferential access for UK goods and services to the European 
internal market, and preferential or reciprocal access for EU goods 
and services to the UK market, is the fallback position of WTO rights. 
These will be on the basis of the most favored nation principle and are 
widely regarded as the least satisfactory outcome. This would be a 
hard Brexit on the most disadvantageous terms for all parties; it 
would be a triumph for those of little faith and even less 
understanding of world trade. The United Kingdom is currently trying 
to investigate the possibilities of concluding bilateral trade deals with 
important partners, such as Commonwealth countries. Until it actually 
leaves the European Union, the United Kingdom has no competence 
to conclude bilateral trade agreements with third countries, and it is 
not entirely clear that third countries will be lining up to conclude 
such arrangements, despite visits from Theresa May or even Boris 
Johnson. There is also the issue of whether the United Kingdom 
would have to apply for separate membership of the WTO or whether 
it could substitute itself out of the EU membership; this would be a 
reverse of what happened under the old General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade 1947 when the European Communities substituted 
themselves for the individual Member States. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
From the above remarks, it is apparent that most conclusions on 
the consequences of Brexit must necessarily be tentative. However, 
some points can be made with certainty. The European Communities 
Act 1972 would be repealed. National legislation implementing prior 
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EU law would remain in force unless expressly repealed as part of the 
withdrawal process or afterwards, and directly applicable EU law will 
be re-enacted as UK law under what is now simply called the Repeal 
Bill. As has been seen, UK judges would no longer be obliged to 
interpret UK law in accordance with the case law and principles 
behind the case law of the ECJ in respect of post-withdrawal 
developments in that case law, although the Repeal Bill will take the 
sensible approach to require them look at its case law prior to Brexit 
as a means of interpreting law which had originally been enacted in 
order to implement EU obligations, whether or not that law had been 
re-enacted. It goes without saying that the UK courts will no longer 
be able to be able or obliged to make a reference for a preliminary 
ruling to the ECJ under Article 267 of the TFEU. EU law will also 
once more be treated as foreign law in UK courts, and would have to 
be proved by evidence. 
Financial aspects will also play a role, as the European Union 
expects the United Kingdom to continue to pay its anticipated share 
of European multiannual programs, at least for the coming few years. 
The contributions to the EU pension scheme will also need to 
continue to be funded, and those former European officials who have 
retired and are in the United Kingdom should be entitled to receive 
their pensions still subject to taxation for the benefit of the European 
Union rather than UK taxation, just as those former EU officials of 
British nationality who are residing in the remaining Member States 
should continue to benefit from existing conditions. Under Article 
28(a) of the EU Staff Regulations, it is possible for the EU institutions 
to take individual decisions to appoint people who are not nationals of 
an EU Member State as officials or temporary agents.66 On the same 
basis, EU officials of UK nationality could be individually continued 
in their existing positions: they work for the European Union and are 
not there as representatives of the United Kingdom, and the 
Commission has made it clear that it will do its best for them.67 
The situation of UK nationals who are resident in the remaining 
Member States and of the nationals of the remaining Member States 
who are resident in the United Kingdom will need to be dealt with in 
                                                                                                             
         66. See Sᴛᴀғғ Rᴇɢᴜʟᴀᴛɪᴏɴs ᴏғ Oғғɪᴄɪᴀʟs ᴏғ ᴛʜᴇ Eᴜʀᴏᴘᴇᴀɴ Cᴏᴍᴍᴜɴɪᴛɪᴇs (2004), 
http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/toc100_en.pdf. 
67. See Tara Palmeri & Carmen Paun, EU leaders to UK staff: we will try to protect you 
after Brexit, PU leaᴄᴏ (Jun. 24, 2016), http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-to-staff-well-
try-to-protect-you-after-brexit-eu-referendum-consquences-uk-leave-europe/. 
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an honest and reciprocal manner.68 It would be most appropriate for 
all States concerned at least to agree to honor existing rights. Possible 
continuing rights of employment, establishment and service 
provision, as well as possible rights for the economically inactive and 
for students will all form important parts of any deal. 
The debate in the United Kingdom has become no less shrill 
following Theresa May’s decision to call a General Election for June 
8, 2017. This was designed to take account of perceived current 
disarray in the Labour Party and to seek a larger Conservative Party 
majority in the House of Commons, which would leave Mrs. May less 
open to the baying of the right-wing Eurosceptic wing of her party. 
The result was certainly not what she expected, and she has been able 
to cling on to power only through a rather shabby deal with the 
Democratic Unionist Party from Northern Ireland; this is pork-barrel 
politics at its lowest. What effect (if any) the election outcome will 
have on the negotiations will become apparent in due course, 
although it is already being stated that Mrs. May’s negotiating red 
lines do not seem to be facilitating sensible negotiations.69 
The Repeal Bill, formally the European Union (Withdrawal) 
Bill, was published on July 13, 2017.70 It unsurprisingly follows the 
approach already announced in the White Paper, discussed above. 
Equally unsurprisingly, it promptly ran into a barrage of criticism, not 
least because of the Henry VIII powers it envisages. Scotland and 
Wales also made their opposition plain.71 If the Scottish Parliament 
and the Welsh Assembly do indeed withhold legislative assent in due 
course, a major domestic constitutional crisis will loom. 
In short, everything is up in the air at the moment, not least 
concerning the role of the CJEU after Brexit, given the diametrically 
opposed views expressed so far by the EU and British negotiators,72 
                                                                                                             
68.   See however, THE UNITED KINGDOM’S EXIT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION (June 
2017), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/621848/
60093_Cm9464_NSS_SDR_Web.pdf, the poverty of which is embarrassing. 
69.   See Theresa May has ‘hamstrung’ David Davis in Brexit talks, BBC (June 30, 
2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40461496. 
70. European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5), available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/cbill_2017-20190005_en_
1.htm.  
71.  Brexit: The UK’s key repeal bill facing challenges, BBC (July 13, 2017) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-40589510. 
72.    See Christopher McCrudden, An early deal-breaker? EU citizens’ rights in the UK 
after Brexit, and the future role of the European Court of Justice, UK Constitutional Law 
Association, https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2017/06/27/christopher-mccrudden-an-early-deal-
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and the feeling of sauve qui peut is still prevalent. The first round has 
gone to the European Union, however, as the EU’s approach of first 
negotiating the terms of withdrawal and only then proceeding, once 
sufficient progress has been made, to negotiate the terms of the future 
relationship, has been accepted by the British negotiating team.73 
The hotheaded rhetoric prevalent in certain sectors of the UK 
press, and the populism of politicians plodding the path to re-election 
on the back of misinformation, fear and prejudice, does not help 
create a positive climate for the coming negotiations. The result of the 
General Election in the United Kingdom is hardly a ringing 
endorsement of Mrs. May’s strategy, but it is very clear that Jeremy 
Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, after a wholly unconvincing 
lukewarm endorsement of the “remain” option during the referendum 
campaign, is totally unwilling to call for a reversal of the lemming-
like Brexit rush, missing thereby a major political opportunity to offer 
a real alternative to the myopic policy of the British Government. 
Reliance on the expertise of civil servants will be necessary, and a 
return to quiet diplomacy and negotiation would benefit all 
concerned. The impression at the moment is that those most 
concerned realize the importance of this. But the outcome of the 
Brexit negotiations, and the viability of Mrs. May’s administration, 
are distinctly shrouded in haze. We will simply, like Asquith, have to 
“wait and see.”74 
 
 
                                                                                                             
breaker-eu-citizens-rights-in-the-uk-after-brexit-and-the-future-role-of-the-european-court-of-
justice/. 
73.   See Rob Merrick, Brexit talks: UK caves in to EU’s demand that divorce terms are 
established before future trade deals, INDEPENDENT (June 19, 2017), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/brexit-talks-negotiations-latest-uk-eu-divorce-deal-
government-agrees-caves-in-before-trade-deal-a7798076.html. 
74.  The phrase was used by Asquith often in 1910. See Rᴏʏ Jᴇɴᴋɪɴs, Asǫᴜɪᴛʜ, ch.14, 
(Harper Collins, 1964). 
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